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Book Reviews
Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s
Military Effectiveness in World War II
by Roger R. Reese
Reviewed by Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

R

oger Reese has already established himself as an
outstanding historian of the Soviet Army. In this
Lawrence, KS:
impressive
book, Reese takes on one of the major quesUniversity Press of
tions of that army’s history, namely the motivation of its
Kansas, 2011
fighting men and women in World War II or, as the Soviets
408 pages
and post-Soviet states still call it, the Great Fatherland
$37.50
War. It is no longer the case that we do not acknowledge
this theater as the decisive one of the war in Europe, and that here as nowhere
else in history we encounter all the terrors and awesome spectacle of total war.
Because this war was the greatest trial of the Soviet system, closely
following the revolution and civil war of 1917-21, and because of the scope of
the Soviet Union’s victory and sacrifice, this war has become the object of a
sustained and ongoing campaign by that government for historical memorialization. The Soviet Union and its successor states have deliberately fashioned
a heroic narrative to explain the sacrifices of the war, the valor of the Soviet
people, and the consequences of victory. This campaign of official mythmaking
quickly attached itself to the question of why Soviet soldiers fought despite the
terrible mismanagement of their commanders, the huge number of prisoners
taken by the Nazis and their allies, and despite a generation of brutality by
the Stalinist regime. Easy answers such as they fought for their homeland, for
Stalin, for socialism, or it was the Nazi atrocities that drove people to fight all
possess some element of truth; however, after reading Reese’s description of
the human dimension of the war, the reader will better understand it in all of its
unadorned complexity.
Now that archives and memoirs have been opened, as was never the
case under Soviet rule, it is possible for scholars like Reese to remind us that
human motivations, whether we examine one man or the masses, never are
simple or uniform. People who had every reason to resent and reject the regime
volunteered or were mobilized as the case may be. Similarly, many who had
reason to fight for the Soviet way of life sought other alternatives. Undoubtedly,
the Soviet regime and its mass media missed no opportunity and spared little in
its attempt to convince Soviet citizens of the rightness of its cause, resulting in
a highly partisan and restricted information campaign to motivate its citizens.
But even when allowing for the propaganda campaign and the influence such
intangibles as Stalin’s persona, socialism, or other more mundane motivations,
it is clear the Soviet people were not an undifferentiated mass of heroic patriots
as the nation’s propaganda machine contended.
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To be certain, heroic valor and endurance were abundant, tragically
all too abundant given the nature of the regime for which people struggled.
Nonetheless, they were and should remain to be seen as human beings not
plaster saints. Reese goes a long way in addressing the question of the Red
Army’s motivation while revealing the genuine complexity that underlay the
motives of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen (and women) in all their diversity
and complexity. Similarly, the author effectively points to the diversity of motivation that sustained unit cohesion and military effectiveness in spite of all the
disasters of 1941-42 and the associated suffering of all Soviets. In demythologizing the war, Reese gives back to the Soviet people something of which both
Hitler and Stalin sought to rob them—their humanity and complexity. For this
readers should be grateful.

The Future of Power
Courtesy of Public Affairs Books

by Joseph S. Nye Jr.
Reviewed by Louis J. Nigro Jr., US Ambassador
(Retired), author of The New Diplomacy in Italy
Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our
influence has waned, doesn’t know what they’re talking about.
—President Barack Obama, 26 January 2012

T

his monograph presents Professor Nye’s current
reflections on the nature of power in international
affairs and how states and nonstate actors will manage
320 pages
or mismanage) the power available to them in the future.
$16.99
The author artfully blends theory and history, concept and
concrete example to make his case. His conclusions are sensible, centrist, and
unsurprising. Among other things, he makes an important contribution to our
understanding of current trends, especially in his analysis of the debate over
whether or not the United States is “in decline,” either relatively or absolutely, in
international affairs.
Joseph Nye has been making important contributions to American
foreign and national security policy and policy debates for decades. As a
University Distinguished Service Professor and former dean of Harvard
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, former Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (197779), chair of the National Intelligence Council (1993-94), Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs (1994-95), and the author of many
influential books, he has been one of the most prominent and consequential of
the nation’s public policy intellectuals. His theory of “soft power” introduced a
new and useful concept to the panoply of political science tools for understanding the international system.
With The Future of Power, Nye makes yet another important contribution
to understanding how the international system works by updating his views on
power while providing a refined version of his signature concept of soft power,
New York: Public
Affairs Books, 2011
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offering significant arguments in the debates related to questions of America’s
alleged decline, and prescribing the use of “smart power” to US policymakers
and implementers. As in so many of his previous efforts at explication, including his outstanding textbook, Understanding International Conflict: A Guide to
Theory and Practice, Nye’s writing in The Future of Power balances simplicity
and accessibility with scholarly precision and documentation.
Nye divides his exposition into three parts. First, in four chapters on
“Types of Power,” he describes the nature of power in international affairs, and
deals with military, economic, and soft power in detail.
Second, in two chapters on “Power Shifts,” he educates his readers on
the difference between power transition from one nation-state to another or
others (a familiar historical process) and power diffusion from nation-states
themselves to nonstate actors (a new phenomenon born of globalization and the
information revolution): “the problem for all states in today’s global information age,” Nye says, “is that more things are happening outside the control of
even the most powerful states.”
For this reviewer, Nye’s take on the “American declinism” debate is a
key strength of the book. This debate got front-page news coverage as a result of
news reports that President Obama’s statement in his State of the Union Address
(quoted above) was inspired by neoconservative strategic thinker Robert
Kagan’s new book, The World America Made, which strongly opposes the view
that American power and influence is on the decline in the international arena.
Nye carefully analyzes the elements of the argument related to the
debate regarding American decline, denying that of possible competitors
(Europe, Japan, Russia, Brazil, India, and China) only China can be considered
a serious contender for the title of top nation. Nye shows how enduring US international advantages—viable alliances and partnerships, economic adaptability,
flexibility and innovation, significant soft power attractiveness in the culture
and ideology of an open society—make predictions of American’s decline far
too pessimistic and unrealistic. Nye asserts that, despite major problems and
obstacles, the US domestic front provides ample reason to believe the United
States has the capacity to maintain its current international leadership position.
This is based on continued prosperity and a constant national sense of purpose,
as the United States exploits alliances (with states) and networks (civil society,
the internationalized information society) in the twenty-first century. Finally,
in a chapter titled “Smart Power,” Nye tries to define how to exercise power
to accomplish foreign and national-security goals, specifically addressing the
American policymaking and policy-implementing elite.
As a practical matter, Nye’s chapters on the nature of power in international affairs, the military, economics, and soft power, respectively, will be
useful if assigned by educators as authoritative reading for classes on this crucial
subject. As noted, Nye’s chapter on “American Declinism” will be highly useful
in classes that deal specifically with America’s international role in the twentyfirst century, especially when considered in relation to the rise of China.
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Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of
Global Power
Courtesy of Basic Books

by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reviewed by John Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer
at the US State Department

I

s America up or down? Will China eclipse America as
the world’s hegemon? What is the shape of the global
New York: Basic
landscape emerging in the twenty-first century, and
Books, 2012
how should the US chart its course in this new world?
208 pages
These questions of critical moment are addressed by the
$26.00
eminent scholar and practitioner of statecraft, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, in Strategic Vision. His book invites comparison with Robert Kagan’s recent work, The World America Made. While Kagan
calls for a muscular defense of a historically unique liberal world order made by
America, Brzezinski offers a new strategic vision for a world where American
dominance is no longer attainable.
According to Brzezinski, our interactive, interdependent world is marked
by a shift in geopolitical power from West to East, with the rise to global preeminence of China, India, and Japan. This redistribution of power is accompanied by
the mass political awakening of previously repressed peoples in the Arab world
and Central or Eastern Europe. These trends portend instability, yet human survival requires global cooperation. Europe is a spent political model for the world
taking shape, and US global supremacy is no longer possible. American society
still appeals to the world’s peoples, provided it can revitalize itself and adopt a
new strategic vision.
Brzezinski ascribes greater significance to the nation’s domestic problems than does Kagan: a crushing national debt; a financial system driven by
self-destructive greed; widening inequality; decaying infrastructure; a citizenry
ignorant of the world; and a gridlocked political system. The author denounces
America’s Iraq and Afghanistan imperial wars and repeats the canard that
President George W. Bush’s global war on terrorism fostered anti-Islamic sentiment, tarnishing our international reputation. In fact, the Bush administration
scrupulously tried to avoid this. On 17 September, six days after 9/11, President
Bush visited the Islamic Center in Washington to assure members that America
understands the vast majority of Muslims are peaceful and that we are at war
with radical jihadist terrorists, not Islam. The President and his aides reaffirmed
that message in numerous speeches and remarks.
Surveying the world “after America,” Brzezinski predicts not Chinese
dominance, but instead, like Kagan, a chaotic multipolar world where several
roughly equal powers compete for regional hegemony. This conflict will
jeopardize international cooperation and the promotion of democracy while
placing the fate of the global commons up for grabs. East and South Asia will
be the flashpoints of geopolitical rivalry with Japan, India, and Russia wary
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of a rising China. Brzezinski states as axiomatic that the United States must
avoid military involvement or, quite differently, any conflict on the mainland
between rival Asian powers. The United States, he argues, should accept
Beijing’s preeminence on the Asian mainland and its emergence as Asia’s
leading economic power. We should balance this by maintaining close ties
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia, as well as
by cultivating cordial relations with India. Brzezinski entertains cautious optimism that continued modernization and prosperity of a peaceful rising China
will foster political pluralism and make it more amenable to the international
democratic mainstream.
What role will America play in this new world? Brzezinski advocates
enlarging the West by drawing Turkey and Russia closer to the European Union
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization while balancing Asian rivalries through
a cooperative partnership with China that reconciles it to its Asian neighbors.
This realistic strategy, he claims, promotes a “revival of the West and facilitates the stabilization of the East within a broader cooperative framework.”
Looking beyond 2025, the author envisions a larger configuration of the West
that includes Turkey and Russia. Casting an eye further ahead, this realist rhapsodizes about the “gradual emergence in the decades ahead of varied forms of
a universal democratic political culture.”
What should we make of a realist strategic vision calling for integration
in a world riven by the centrifugal forces of nationalism and sectarian, racial,
and ethnic animosities? Seventy years ago George Orwell wrote, “One cannot
see the modern world as it is unless one recognises the overwhelming strength
of patriotism, national loyalty . . . one must admit that the divisions between
nation and nation are founded on real differences of outlook.” Nowhere is
this truer today than in the Muslim world. Nonetheless, Brzezinski attributes
European, especially French and German, reluctance to absorb Islamic Turkey
into the West to an ambivalent or ambiguous state of mind about an unassimilable alien culture. Europeans have had enough of the elite EU project,
ignoring Eurocrats and repudiating it whenever given the opportunity. The
Euro debt crisis has frayed already tenuous bonds and proved that Greeks will
never behave like Germans any more than Sicilians will behave like Chinese.
Moreover, the EU, already suffering enlargement indigestion, has had enough
of Muslim immigrants. Small wonder that France and Germany, Europe’s
largest countries with populations of 65 and 81 million respectively, are loathe
to merge with 80 million Muslim Turks.
Prospects for drawing Russia into a Western embrace appear no more
auspicious. Brzezinski concedes numerous obstacles, not least the absence of
the rule of law and the current power elite’s opposition, thwart the political
modernization of Russia necessary for genuine collaboration with the West. Yet
despite whatever the intelligentsia and Dmitry Medvedev may tell Brzezinski
in their private chit-chats, the odds are long against regime change in this “wild
country,” as Ambassador Michael McFaul indelicately called it. The Russian
regime is fragile and contains the seeds of its own destruction. Russia depends
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entirely on energy exports and has failed to modernize its Third World economy.
Systemic corruption and secrecy in decisionmaking about policy and personnel
matters block necessary political and economic reforms. Reforms are not possible without loss of political control. Corruption is the political glue holding
the regime together, but exposure of corruption would destroy the criminal
syndicate ruling the country. The regime’s survival requires its suicide.
If a larger configuration of the West, including Turkey and Russia, is pie
in the sky, a Sino-American partnership likewise strains the bounds of optimism.
One need not exaggerate the Chinese threat to give due weight to the potential
for regional conflict in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea. Brzezinski
warns against American military involvement on the mainland between rival
Asian powers. We can presume, however, that thoughtful observers agree with
former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s admonition that “any future defense
secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into
Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” The
only plausible scenario for US military action in Asia is a high-end naval, air,
space, or cyberspace engagement. Gates outlined the forward deployment of
the US military across the Pacific Rim to maintain maritime security and open
access to international waterways. US forces will become more geographically
distributed and operationally resilient, extending from Northeast to Southeast
Asia and into the Indian Ocean.
Finally, what does Brzezinski mean by a “universal democratic political
culture?” Does he express the American ethnocentric belief that the peoples of
the world all want to be like us rather than vent their own passions and appetites?
The author’s democratic universalism ignores peoples’ political culture—their
values, habits, customs—and the propitious material circumstances that make
decent, stable, effective self-government possible. His vision suggests merely
some form of electoral democracy, head-counting, which produces not the
blessings of Western liberal democracy, but the ability of 51 percent of the
people to control the other 49 percent. A post-American world without the
United States imposing order will be a nasty, brutish place, not a harmonious,
universal democratic culture. Ironically, Strategic Vision offers an unrealistic
vision of a post-American world.
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Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide: What
Each Side Must Know About The Other—And
About Itself

Sterling, VA:
Potomac Books,
2010

by Bruce Fleming
Reviewed by Charles Allen, COL (USA Retired),
Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army
War College

W

hile many treatments of civil-military relations focus
on the exchange between appointed and elected
officials with their uniformed senior military officers,
283 pages
this book examines the gap between American military
$27.50
culture and the civilian society it serves. The author is no
stranger to the critique and provocation of the military establishment. While not
inside the profession of arms, Dr. Bruce Fleming has the unique perspective
of a civilian academic with long-standing engagement in a sector of the US
military. Fleming has served over 25 years as a tenured professor of English at
the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. An author of several books and
recipient of writing awards, in this work he tackles thorny issues in a pedantic
style that belies his passion for the subject. Fleming’s opening line offers, “It’s
critically important in a democracy to encourage open thinking about how to
improve its military.” This statement rings true after more than a decade of
conflict and the transition to an era of uncertainty for America’s security forces.
Fleming crafts the book in an organized and deliberate manner to
support his case that the US military-civilian gap does indeed exist. He then
goes on to explicate the factors that allowed the gap to widen in the twentyfirst century. A scholar well-versed in philosophy and literature, Fleming
provides a primer on values and virtues, commonly touted as differentiating
factors between military members and civilians in American society. He
counters that belief with, “the military as a whole has no separable virtues,
morals, or religion. All it has is technical virtues, pragmatic morality, and
generalized, nondivisive religion.” Because of mutual misperceptions of each
other’s roles, society has provided the military with the aura of monopolies
and a degree of autonomy (in some cases, with undue deference) in how it
conducts business. Fleming offers that the role of the military is that of the
hammer to be wielded by the hand of democracy. He cautions that, too often,
the military perceives itself as responsible for directing when, where, and
how the hammer’s blow is to be struck. In doing so, the military forgets it is
not the hand of civilian disposition.
Readers may come away from this book like a punch-drunk fighter.
Fleming provides a series of blows—jabs, hooks, and haymakers—that may
or may not connect, but have the military reader ducking. What is the nature
of war, virtue, religion, and human sexuality? And why should these questions matter to our military? He skewers the sacred cows of military virtue and
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values, which have permitted the military to maintain its self-image as being
above and superior to that of American society.
Naval Academy students in Fleming’s classes must leave feeling
uncomfortably confused but invigorated by the challenges to the taken-forgranted assumptions and beliefs integral to military culture. Readers external
to his classroom experience might incorrectly charge Fleming with being racist,
sexist, homophobic, and anti-Christian.
The author does not deny the need for diversity but is at odds at how
the military goes about achieving it, especially for the service academies. He is
against establishing policies and de facto quotas to ensure correct representation
of the general population at the various academies. He is especially critical when
the administration denies applicants who are more qualified the opportunity to
attend. In the same light, he asserts the very nature of warfare and the inherent
masculinity required to prosecute war effectively does not support women in
the ranks since they significantly impact the male bonding process. Allowing
openly gay members, he holds, would have the same adverse effect. In these
instances, Fleming is decidedly not politically correct as he contests changes in
the military that mirror changing attitudes in the general society. Many service
academy graduates will raise an eyebrow as the author unabashedly targets
their sports program, which he believes allows less qualified student-athletes
into the academies.
The weakest sections of the book are Fleming’s accounts of conflict
with Naval Academy leaders. While he presents these incidents as illustrations
of his themes, military readers may discount them as whining or attempts to
get back at his superiors (this is part of their culture). Discerning readers will
acknowledge such incidents occur with administrators who function within
bureaucracies and others who may see themselves as institutional stewards.
Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide is necessary reading for military
leaders at company-grade and above. The tendency within the military will be
to dismiss out of hand the questions and challenges posed by Fleming. That
would be a mistake. It is essential that members of the profession of arms are
able to intelligently engage in a discourse and have a clear understanding of the
profession and its role in service to the nation.
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Dana Priest and William M. Arkin’s Top Secret America

Top Secret America: The Rise of the New
American Security State
by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin
Reviewed by David W. Astin, Student, US Army War
College.

I

n Top Secret America, authors Dana Priest and William
Arkin explore the “intelligence-military-corporate
New York, NY:
apparatus” that has grown into a sprawling universe of its
Little, Brown and
own since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. With
Company, 2011
Priest as primary author and Arkin serving as chief re320 pages
searcher, the two have expanded a four-part series of arti$27.99
cles they first published in the Washington Post in 2010.
The result is an in-depth account of the enormous complex of organizations
and agencies that have emerged in the decade since 9/11 to defend the country
from the threat of terrorism. The purpose of the book is to promote debate about
whether or not the response from the government is in the best interest of state
security or has been conducted at the expense of individual liberties and democratic values. As the authors contend, “Only more transparency and debate will
make us safe from terrorism and the challenges faced by the United States.”
The rise of the new American security state, which is the book’s subtitle,
is the result of the overwhelming growth of the security industry and its vested
interest in perpetuating the cycle of fear that 9/11 engendered. One of the book’s
overarching themes is that such growth has not translated into greater security.
As evidence, the authors cite cases such as US Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s
shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, as well as Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to ignite an explosive device hidden
in his underwear on a flight bound for Detroit, Michigan, in December 2009.
In these and other cases, the authors assert that “lack of disciplined focus, not
lack of resources,” resulted in the failure of intelligence and security officials
to detect the emerging threat. On a larger scale, such a lack of focus led to the
colossal intelligence failure of 2011, namely the Arab Spring. The intelligence
community’s inability to unearth the “dynamic political change sweeping
across the Middle East” left American policymakers completely unprepared to
promote acceptable alternatives. That no one is actually in charge should be a
cause for concern among policymakers and citizens alike.
Acting on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress
approved and the president signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004. The IRTPA established the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and gave its leader responsibility over all intelligence matters. National policymakers viewed this as a
necessary measure to rectify the perceived failure of the intelligence community
to connect available information from various organizations, to include the CIA
and FBI, that might have prevented the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As noted in Top
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Secret America, the IRTPA failed to give the DNI authority over all intelligence
matters, a key distinction that continues to impede the effectiveness of the position. As Priest and Arkin note, the passage of the IRTPA revealed the members
of the intelligence community did not want to “give up the power they had
over their budgets, personnel, and mission, and neither did the many congressional committees that supervised them and funded them.” It also revealed
no one was willing to take on the entrenched interests that have resulted in
an intelligence apparatus that, as of 2010, was 250 percent larger than it was
on 10 September 2001. The estimated budget is approximately $80.1 billion
for the intelligence community, but it does not include the $58 billion for the
Department of Homeland Security, created in the aftermath of 9/11. As the
authors assert, this growth has come “without anyone in government seriously
trying to figure out where overlaps and waste were.”
This lack of visibility extends to the controlled access programs (CAPs)
run by the CIA as well as the Pentagon’s special access programs (SAPs), which
exist to give their respective organizations additional protection against unauthorized disclosure. As the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
stated, “There’s only one entity in the entire universe that has visibility on all
SAPs—that’s God.” While the authors note that DOD has the bulk of the access
programs, just as it has more than two-thirds of intelligence assets, the authors
do not distinguish among the various types of CAPs and SAPs. The authors
emphasize the lack of visibility on the vast number of programs and the fact
that only a handful of senior government officials known as “Super Users”
have access to them, which further compounds the problems the intelligence
community faces in information sharing.
An area the book explores is the role of contractors in the intelligencemilitary-corporate apparatus. Priest and Arkin estimate there are 854,000
Americans with top-secret clearances, 265,000 of whom are contractors.
Following 9/11, government officials intended to achieve cost savings by
bringing large numbers of contractors into the intelligence and security arenas.
Unfortunately for American taxpayers, this turned out be another miscalculation. The authors note a 2008 study published by ODNI found contractors
made up 29 percent of the workforce in the intelligence agencies but cost the
equivalent of 49 percent of their personnel budgets. Of further note, former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said defense contractors cost him 25 percent
more than federal employees. Though Gates vowed to reduce his department’s
reliance on private contractors, he was unable to achieve a substantive reduction, and “by the Obama administration’s second year in office, its modest goal
was to reduce the number of hired hands by 7 percent over two years.” The
reason was simply that contractors had become entrenched in so many aspects
of carrying out the mission that “what started as a clever temporary fix has
turned into a dependency.”
Another theme of Top Secret America is that policymakers are flooded
with marginally informative and redundant conclusions, and major challenges
exist in processing the enormous volume of intelligence gathered. Data is often
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outdated by the time it arrives to the appropriate decisionmaking entity, thus
making it essential to develop an efficient processing, exploitation, and dissemination cycle capable of culling the most essential intelligence elements.
Unfortunately, the emphasis appears to be on the development of technology and
equipment rather than the means that direct such technology to the proper end.
One final theme in Top Secret America that warrants consideration by
intelligence policymakers is the erosion of civil liberties for the alleged sake of
security, a central concern of the authors. Priest and Arkin emphasize this theme
repeatedly, contending “people seem not to notice the incremental changes taking
place across the country, the eroding of privacy and the tabulation of personal
information in government hands.” In spite of claims by advocates of greater
security, the authors cite numerous instances of unwarranted surveillance and
harassment of innocent individuals and groups at the hands of federal, state, and
local officials. Thus, in the authors’ view, it is time to “close the decade-long
chapter of fear, to confront the colossal sum of money that could have been
saved or better spent, to remember what we are truly defending,” and in so doing
usher in a new era of “openness and better security against our enemies.”
At 277 pages, Top Secret America flows smoothly across the political
and military spectrums and from the national to local levels. For many readers,
the book’s strength will be found in the ability of the authors to highlight the
defining characteristics of Top Secret America, namely “its enormous size, its
counterproductive duplication, its internal secrecy, and its old-fashioned, hierarchical structure.” However, in the process of making their point, the authors’
advocacy tends to become redundant and unbalanced. Those in the intelligence,
counterterrorism, and homeland security arenas emerge as automatons in a
hidden world or a sleepless place that ingests endless volumes of information
that, in turn, is presented at acronym-laden, unemotional briefings. The authors
contend today’s intelligence-security world has become a living, breathing
organism, one that is impossible to control or curtail. While there is a great
deal of validity in such claims, there is little or no recognition of successes
in the areas the authors attack, nor is there much in the way of recognition of
individuals who have performed admirably and worked selflessly in defense of
America. The authors could have provided such recognition without diminishing their central themes. Nevertheless, Top Secret America does emerge as a
powerful story that makes for essential reading for those interested in the shape
that America’s future security will take. For America’s policymakers, it does
not necessarily provide solutions, but it does provide warnings that should not
go unheeded.
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Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination
in the East
by Stephen G. Fritz
Reviewed by Richard W. Harrison, author of The
Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940, and
Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and
Theories of G.S. Isserson

T

his reviewer must confess to a keen sense of anticipation when I first picked up a copy of Ostkrieg: Hitler’s
War of Extermination in the East. The Eastern Front
664 pages
during World War II is one of the few remaining areas of
$39.95
the conflict that still holds the possibility of new discoveries for the serious student of military history. This is due
primarily to the information coming out of the Russian military archives since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the corresponding German archives
have already been heavily mined and contain few surprises.
This context should be kept in mind when deciding whether to purchase
this book. As the author admits in the preface, the book is not a work based
on primary research, but rather represents a synthesis, an integrated narrative,
based on research by historians from several Western countries, particularly
Germany. Indeed, the author’s bibliography is most impressive and relies
heavily on German-language sources. Therein lies the book’s strength as well
as its weakness.
The almost-exclusively German focus serves the author well in dealing
with such questions as the ideological underpinnings of Hitler’s campaign in
the East. He skillfully lays out the notion that Hitler’s dream of Lebensraum for
the German people could only be realized at the expense of the Slavic and other
peoples inhabiting the western part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). This was certainly convenient, as Hitler had long before singled out the
Soviet Union as the nexus of a worldwide Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy. More
grounded in reality was the belief that only by colonizing the area west of the
Ural Mountains, Germany’s India, could Hitler hope to achieve the economic
wherewithal to sustain Germany in a final showdown with an American-led
coalition and avoid a repetition of the German collapse of 1918.
These calculations also determined the timing of the attack. Fritz makes
a good case that Hitler, stymied by British intransigence in the West, had only
a very narrow window of opportunity in 1941 to destroy the Soviet Union
before the United States could lend its enormous weight to the Allied cause.
Time, as the author stresses throughout the work, was always against Hitler and
Germany’s ability to quickly dispose of the USSR; it eventually forced him into
a losing struggle against a much more powerful coalition.
Fritz does a commendable job in examining what this meant for the
various nationalities inhabiting Hitler’s projected colonial empire—tens of
millions deliberately starved so that the Ostheer and the German nation might
Lexington:
University Press of
Kentucky, 2011
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eat, as well as the more direct methods of extermination that eventually superceded this plan. This aspect of the book will inevitably invite comparisons with
Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, which will
remain the gold standard in this area for many years to come. Fritz’s focus is
inevitably narrower in terms of time and place, although this should not be held
against him.
Unfortunately, the author’s approach, which he freely admits is told
from the German perspective, is less conducive to a balanced understanding of
the strictly military aspects of this gigantic struggle. This is due to his heavy
reliance on German-language sources, which lead him to view the ebb and flow
of combat from a distinctly German point of view. Such an approach hobbles the
book from its very inception and recalls some of the books published during the
first postwar years, when our appreciation of the Eastern Front was permanently
skewed by the memoirs of such German generals as Manstein and Guderian.
Indeed, the very organization of the book reflects this lopsided version
of events. Of the book’s 10 chapters, the first two deal with the overall strategic
situation preceding the war; Hitler’s political, economic, and racial motivations
for the invasion of the Soviet Union; and the German preparations for the attack.
The next two chapters chronicle the German army’s fortunes in the East from the
start of the invasion on 22 June 1941 to the eve of the Soviet counteroffensive
in early December, or fully a quarter of the book’s text. Chapter 5 deals with the
Ostheer’s struggle to contain the Red Army’s counteroffensive, while Chapter 6
covers the German advance during the summer campaign of 1942 to the Soviet
counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Thus, of the book’s 395 pages dealing with military operations, 221 pages, or 56 percent, cover the period when the Germans
were primarily on the offensive.
Once the initiative passes to the Red Army, however, Fritz hurries to
bring the book to its inevitable conclusion, as if he had unconsciously absorbed
the upbeat narrative of the Ostheer’s offensive period, while imbibing the
grimmer picture (at least for the Germans) of the war’s final two years. Chapter 7, for example, quickly disposes of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad,
the German Sixth Army’s death agony, and the failure of the German offensive
at Kursk. Chapter 8 skims over the events of the German retreat in Ukraine
to the spring of 1944, while Chapter 9 attempts to encompass the numerous
Soviet offensives from the summer of 1944. Finally, Chapter 10 manages to
cram in the Red Army’s winter offensive of 1945 and the culminating operation to take Berlin, but you get the picture.
Unfortunately, by abandoning any pretense of being a balanced account
of the war, the author becomes, in effect, a prisoner of his sources, much to the
detriment of the overall narrative. Thus Ostkrieg, while moderately successful as a political-ideological analysis of the war in the East, ultimately fails as
military history.
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A Glorious Army: Robert E. Lee’s Triumph,
1862-1863
Courtesy of Simon & Schuster

by Jeffry D. Wert
Reviewed by Major Joseph C. Scott, Instructor,
Department of History, US Military Academy

J

effry Wert’s A Glorious Army is an insightful command
study of the senior leadership in the Confederate Army
of Northern Virginia from the summer of 1862 until the
New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2011
summer of 1863, a crucial time in the American Civil
400 pages
War. Focusing on General Robert E. Lee and his wellknown subordinates Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, James
$30.00
Longstreet, J. E. B. Stuart, A. P. Hill, and others, Wert
shows how a cadre of talented military professionals led their force of valiant,
if disorderly, soldiers to a virtually uninterrupted string of battlefield successes
until their reversal in the fields near Gettysburg in 1863.
Wert’s account presents a conventional—if often challenged—argument that the keys to Lee’s operational and tactical success were his aggressive
nature, his subordinates’ abilities, and his opponents’ excessive caution or outright incompetence. Like many historians in this camp, Wert agrees with Lee’s
assessment that the Confederacy needed an aggressive strategy because of its
inferior numbers and resource base. The South could not outlast the North in
a defensive war of attrition, and needed spectacular military success to get
those people in the Union to allow the South its independence. This aggressive approach, Wert claims, was desperately needed. Lee assumed command
of the Army of Northern Virginia in June 1862 when the full might of the
Union Army of the Potomac was poised on the outskirts of Richmond. The
Confederate army had just been repulsed in its efforts to relieve the capital,
but Lee’s way of war rescued Richmond by forcing a Union withdrawal in the
Seven Days Battles. Lee’s repeated seizure of the strategic imitative allowed
his Army to nearly destroy the forces of John Pope in the Second Battle of
Manassas, invade Maryland, and escape largely intact after the chaos of
Antietam. In December, Lee’s forces won a relatively easy victory against a
bungled Federal attack at Fredericksburg, and in the following spring Lee’s
audacity led to his greatest triumph against astounding numerical odds at
Chancellorsville. These successes were costly, however, as key subordinates
(particularly Stonewall Jackson) were lost, and the army suffered immense
casualties. Wert emphasizes that, despite the costs, these victories boosted élan
and confidence in the Confederate Army, and solidified morale throughout the
South. Gettysburg, however, brought Lee’s string of victories to a halt when the
very aggressiveness and confidence that had brought so much success instead
resulted in shattering defeat.
Students familiar with the Civil War will find little new in Wert’s book.
The account is in many ways classic top-down, flags-and-generals military
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history. He relies heavily on well-travelled primary sources and Civil War
memoirs, and quotes liberally from scholars like Douglas Southall Freeman,
Gary Gallagher, and Robert Krick, who have all gone this way before. This is,
however, a good introductory work for students of the art of command or those
looking for a good survey of this critical period and theater of the Civil War.
The accounts of battles and campaigns are relatively clear, and the profiles of
the Confederate leaders are in-depth and quite revealing in their humanity.
That being said, Wert is not afraid to take a stand on some contested
issues within Civil War historiography. Though he is full of effusive praise for
the Confederate leaders’ accomplishments in the face of such overwhelming
odds, he highlights critical mistakes, even in their greatest tactical victories.
Such mistakes were especially detrimental because they increased Confederate
casualties and prevented Lee’s army from ever really crushing their dogged
opponents. Given the South’s objectives and limited manpower, such shortcomings were potentially deadly, and he portrays Lee’s frequent disappointment
when Union forces, though badly beaten, managed to escape to fight another
day. Wert freely castigates Lee for his occasional mistakes, such as the wide
dispersal of his command in hostile territory prior to Antietam, and for the
overconfidence and lack of respect for his enemy that led to the Pickett’s
Charge debacle at Gettysburg. Though he praises Lee’s effective subordinates,
none of them escape entirely unscathed. Wert downplays the tactical reputation of “Stonewall” Jackson, for example, instead praising his ability to drive
and motivate the men in his command. He highlights Longstreet’s abilities, but
also points out Longstreet was not above embellishing events in his memoirs.
Worshipful partisans of the Confederate military pantheon may be troubled by
the tarnish Wert puts on some of his portraits.
At its heart, this is a story about individuals and personalities. If there
is any great flaw in A Glorious Army, it lies in Wert’s occasional detours into
moments of flowery, romantic prose that clash awkwardly with what is generally an effective narrative of real human beings struggling amidst the chaos
and inhumanity of warfare in the Civil War era. Lee, his lieutenants, and their
Army were able to accomplish an astounding series of triumphs, but at great,
and ultimately futile, cost.
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Courtesy of Potomac Books

Shadow of the Sultan’s Realm: The
Destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the
Creation of the Modern Middle East
by Daniel Allen Butler
Reviewed by Dr. Rasheed Hosein, Assistant Professor
of Middle Eastern and Islamic History, United States
Military Academy

I

n recent years, there has been a growing conviction in
popular scholarship for a more pragmatic and longue
durée approach to the study of the formation of the
302 pages
modern Middle East. In so doing, there have been many
$29.95
noteworthy—and some not so noteworthy—contributions
to the field. Most center around the post Great War mandatory system and tell
the story of the resulting states in relation to their European tutors. Scholars are
beginning, however, to address the role of the long-neglected Ottoman Empire
in this narrative and examine how the death of this once great empire actually
shaped the region. It is with this idea that Daniel Butler begins his survey,
attempting to show that the configuration of states we call the Middle East is as
much a product of Ottoman machinations while the empire existed as European
ones after its demise.
Butler begins his survey by outlining in broad strokes the contours of
the formation and expansion of the Ottoman Empire. It is regrettable the author
included this foundational chapter, because it marks the weakest section of the
book. There are some glaring factual errors—his claims that the Ottoman Empire
was some fourteen hundred years old being the most egregious. Mistakes such
as these demonstrate an author trying to do too much, without possessing the
necessary foundation to execute this part of the book. This sort of essentialism
is all too common in monographs where the author attempts to synthesize huge
swathes of history; however, given the author’s stated aim is not a discussion
of the origin and high-water mark of Ottoman rule, but its decline, this error
can be forgiven.
Where this work really shines is when Butler compresses the time
period and digs deeply into the material. His lead-up to the Great War makes
for an interesting examination of the interactions of the Great Powers and
the precipitous military build-up between the navies of Great Britain and the
German Empire. Likewise, his discussion on the various campaigns as they
pertained to Ottomans, once hostilities began, is detailed and lively written. His
descriptions of the Ottoman Grandees and their dealings with their European
counterparts read as fascinating character studies, and his analysis of the historical outcomes are authoritative and logical. The Ottoman triumvirate of Ismail
Enver Pasha, Ahmed Jamal Pasha, and Mehmet Talat Pasha really comes alive,
and the author pays close attention to them, from their highs as power brokers
Washington, DC:
Potomac Books,
2011
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in the Committee of Union and Progress after the 1913 coup to the ignominy of
their deaths roughly a decade later.
One element that is all too common in works appearing in this genre
though, is the lack of even an attempt to utilize primary source materials
from the Middle East or to tell the Ottoman story from an Ottoman-centered
perspective. While Topkapi Serai archives are currently closed to the public,
making access to some critical official and diplomatic records difficult, often
the voice of these narratives is decidedly European. We should laud Butler
for his attempt at constructing a narrative that speaks from the Turkish point
of view. While his bibliography is overwhelmingly constructed of European
language sources, there are (as mentioned above) some critical biographies of
Ottoman notables included. Though this is a European driven narrative, the
Ottoman Empire does not appear as a passive—although not mute—witness
to the events in which it was to participate, but rather as an active participant
in its own downfall.
In the title of this work, the author suggests he will tackle the creation of
the modern Middle East that emerged from the rubble of the Ottoman Empire,
but there is very little of this element in the work. This is the Ottoman Empire’s
story and the book concludes with the treaties that ended the allied occupation
of the Anatolian peninsula and the formal dissolution of the old empire. We
see little commentary on the arcs and trajectories of the various kingdoms and
states that would arise out of her wreckage. Interested parties should look to
new entries to the market such as James Barr’s A Line in the Sand: The AngloFrench Struggle for the Middle East, 1914-1948; Efraim Karsh’s Empires of
the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1948; or even the
now well-aged but still excellent narrative in David Fromkin’s A Peace to End
All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern
Middle East.
In conclusion, aside from the unfortunate first chapter, there is much
that is praiseworthy in this work. Butler is able to successfully straddle the line
of an Ottoman work without forgetting the Ottomans. If one is looking for a
lively and easily read book describing the death throes of the Ottoman Empire
and its conduct prior to and through the Great War, then look no further. If one
is looking for a work that leverages the formation of the modern Middle East
into the equation, then some other works are likely better choices. With those
caveats in mind, in the realm of nonspecialist literature on this critical period
of Middle Eastern history, this book is a good option.
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Eisenhower: The White House Years

Courtesy of Doubleday

by Jim Newton
Reviewed by Major Josiah Grover, Instructor of
Military History, United States Military Academy

I

n 2009, the Eisenhower Presidential Library revealed
the prolific historian and Eisenhower biographer
Stephen Ambrose fabricated interviews he claimed to
New York:
have had with the former president. Ambrose’s biography
Doubleday, 2011
of Dwight D. Eisenhower had long been regarded as the
451 pages
definitive biography because of the author’s unique access
$29.95
to the 34th president. The discovery of Ambrose’s deception has made his biography suspect for both scholars
and leaders seeking to understand Ike, while opening the door for new and
more genuine appraisals of the former president. Jim Newton offers one such
appraisal with a new biography of Ike in Eisenhower: The White House Years.
The author of the previous work, Justice for All, a historical account of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, is the latest Eisenhower biographer seeking to rehabilitate
the image of a supposed caretaker president. Contrary to contemporary critics
like Marquis Childs, who portrayed Eisenhower as “indecisive and lazy, stodgy
and limited . . . a weak president,” Newton argues Ike was “certain, resolute,
and, though respectful of his advisers, commandingly their boss.” In offering
the thesis that President Eisenhower was an active leader in his administration,
Newton builds upon the work of diplomatic historians and political scientists,
notably Fred Greenstein, and does so in a very sympathetic fashion. As the title
suggests, however, the author delivers not so much a biography of President
Eisenhower but a biography of his presidency.
The story begins with Ike’s childhood and passes rapidly through adolescence, tracing his path to the United States Military Academy, where Ike was
both average and memorable.”An assignment in Texas followed graduation,
where he met Mamie Doud. They married, welcomed and then lost a son, and
decamped for Panama, where Eisenhower served under the tutelage of mentor
General Fox Connor. That apprenticeship on the perimeter of the American
empire kept Ike out of troop command in World War I. In the interwar period
he served a second apprenticeship under the gimlet eye of General Douglas
MacArthur. Service with MacArthur in Washington and later in the Philippines
made Eisenhower wary of theatrics. When war broke out in 1941, General
George Marshall selected the young general to head the War Plans Division on
the Army Staff and then, ultimately, to lead Allied forces to victory in Europe.
The author covers all of this background rather quickly, driving the
narrative toward Eisenhower’s presidential years, which comprise 85 percent
of the biography. The theme throughout is Ike’s search for a “middle way,” an
attempt to steer policy between perceived extremist positions on the political
right and left. Seeing as The Middle Way is the title of Eisenhower’s presidential
papers, it is an easy assertion to accept, though there are holes in every story.
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Newton gives cautious credit to Ike for his civil rights record, asserting that by
supporting Attorney General Herbert Brownell, the president was practicing
a calibrated strategy for easing racial tensions in the fullness of time. A more
critical biographer might interpret Ike’s record on civil rights as an abdication
of presidential responsibility to enforce the law.
Other domestic topics include Eisenhower’s appointments to the
Supreme Court, the administration’s assertion of executive privilege, and the
president’s refusal to confront Senator Joe McCarthy during the height of the
Red Scare, where Newton asserts “nothing was inevitable, even Ike’s break
with McCarthy.” Eisenhower did confront accusations of socialism by his own
party for supporting the highway bill and the construction of the St. Lawrence
Seaway, underscoring the fears of communism that were rampant in the 1950s.
The internal politics of the administration are addressed in detail, including
the close partnership between the president and John Foster Dulles, as well as
the more complicated relationship Ike forged with his young vice-president,
Richard Nixon.
The administration’s foreign policy receives more in-depth treatment,
from the development of a national security strategy centered on massive retaliation in the Solarium exercise to the conduct of covert operations against Iran
and Guatemala. Irritated by French military misdirection during World War II,
Ike rebuffed French pleas for assistance in Indochina in 1954, refusing to use
American combat power to underwrite a “frantic desire of the French to remain
a world power.” Eisenhower employed strong-arm diplomacy against allies
France, Britain, and Israel during the 1956 Suez crisis and a more conciliatory
diplomacy with hostile China over the straits of Taiwan. The most important
diplomatic relationship was between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and
Eisenhower, a relationship that may have eased Cold War tensions had it not
fallen apart in the wake of the 1960 U2 incident. Interestingly, an administration that sought to influence global affairs, led by a famous general, deployed
American troops only once on a peace-keeping mission in Lebanon. The litany
of international affairs drawing American attention over the course of the
Eisenhower presidency supports Newton’s argument for a reimagining of the
1950s as a deceptively eventful decade, kept under control by a president who
actively worked to keep the nation on an even keel.
According to the author, President Eisenhower found an effective middle way and won the United States the peace it enjoyed over the course of his
presidency. He made progress on advancing civil rights, supported his able subordinates, contained the growth of the American defense establishment, and did
it all with little loss of life. Eisenhower: The White House Years is well written
and researched, with sufficient endnotes and a full bibliography. Jim Newton
draws from a wide variety of sources, including the Eisenhower Library and
interviews with Ike’s son, John Eisenhower. Newton also makes use of newly
discovered documents to explore the drafting and evolution of the president’s
famous farewell speech. The biography is sympathetic to Eisenhower throughout—where others have criticized Ike’s record on civil rights, Newton offers
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cautious credit; where others have been critical of Ike’s generalship, Newton
is complimentary; where others have indicted Eisenhower’s relationship with
wartime driver Kay Summersby, Newton is inclined to forgive. Despite these
partialities to his subject, the book is well worth reading. It is suitable for scholars
and senior members of the defense establishment. As a single volume treatment
of the Eisenhower presidency, it is invaluable, especially for understanding the
context of decisions made in both foreign relations and domestic policy.

The Age of Airpower
Courtesy of Public Affairs Books

by Martin Van Creveld
Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, Professor for
National Security Affairs, United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College

E

ver since the Wright brothers demonstrated the possibility of flight in a heavier-than-air aircraft, airpower
has
become a standard feature of military operations,
New York: Public
Affairs Books, 2011
especially those conducted by the United States. Any
number of air forces have been the subject of numerous
498 pages
works, especially those of Germany in World War II and
$35.00
its American and British opponents. Noted military historian, critic, and professional controversialist Martin van Creveld has now
tackled the subject in a broad way with his latest work, The Age of Airpower.
Van Creveld takes the long view in a largely chronological fashion,
beginning with the first employment of aircraft in a military manner, starting
with the Italians in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912. The first major test of the
potential of airpower was a World War I (WWI) challenge that the air forces
of all the major combatants passed. Once it became clear airpower was here
to stay, the major military powers turned to the question of how to incorporate
air forces into their existing military. In many cases, incorporation meant the
creation of an independent air service, closely linked to the emerging theories
regarding the criticality of command of the air proposed by such thinkers as
Giulio Douhet.
To his credit, Van Creveld does not limit his discussion to regular air
forces. He includes extensive narration and commentary on the development
and expansion of naval-air and its most common expression, the aircraft carrier.
Here the author concentrates the majority of his attention on the two preeminent
powers in this arena—Japan and the United States.
Van Creveld provides a fairly conventional discussion of the conduct of
World War II and the air warfare, including naval operations. He fails, however,
to note one of the great ironies of airpower theory and practice. The original
airpower theorists proposed the use of aircraft and strategic bombing to avoid
a repeat of the costly attritional warfare that was a hallmark of WWI. In actual
practice, though, air warfare became the ultimate example of attrition warfare.
Germany and Japan both lost control of the air because the Allies were able
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to kill or disable pilots and other aircrew faster than they could be replaced.
Van Creveld points out the doctrine of strategic bombing in actual practice fell
short of expectations, mainly due to the limitations of the aircraft used, at least
until the advent of the Boeing B-29, which the author classifies as the first true
strategic bomber.
The emergence of atomic weapons is covered in depth. Van Creveld implies, correctly, that the development of atomic and later nuclear weapons did
little to change the actual conduct of warfare. Rather, the specter of atomic and
nuclear weapons had a greater impact on whether or not a country went to war.
Equally important was the advent of jet technology. The impact of jet
propulsion over the long term, he suggests, has been deleterious to air forces.
As time has passed, the expense involved in developing new generations of jet
aircraft has become prohibitive. At the same time, the higher performance of
jet aircraft, especially in terms of speed and endurance, poorly suits them to
specific employment, especially close-air support and counterinsurgency—two
missions air forces do not like anyway. The emergence of nuclear weapons
reduced the likelihood that strategic bombers would be employed in a strategic
attack role, given the possibility of escalation; this was especially true during
the Cold War era. With the two major super powers veritably off limits because
of the nuclear threat, bombers could not be used to any real effect in the proxy
wars that were a hallmark of the Cold War, mainly due to a dearth of strategic
targets. Thus, air forces found themselves facing situations like Vietnam, where
strategic bombers were often utilized against tactical targets. This brings Van
Creveld to the conclusion that airpower, especially jet-powered aircraft, has
proven of limited utility in conflicts since World War II.
Aside from traditional kinetics, Van Creveld examines several other
types of airpower, including helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft in transport and
reconnaissance roles, and the later technology of missiles and drones. In regard
to the latter, he sees drones as the future of airpower, since drones are cheaper
than piloted aircraft, be they land or naval based. His comments will provide
much grist for conversation in the Pentagon.
The book does have flaws. Van Creveld, for example, eschews any discussion of the German V weapons, stating they were the province of the army,
an assertion that is only half true. While the V-2 was indeed the German army’s
program, the V-1 belonged to the Luftwaffe. While Van Creveld has an excellent
grasp of the literature, there are times when he might have done better to reacquaint himself with an archive or research library, as opposed to resorting to such
dubious sources as Wikipedia®. Finally, there are times when the author falls
into an old and unfortunate trap, making statements that are simply obnoxious
or, at best, infelicitous, particularly with regard to women. Occasionally, Van
Creveld tends toward sheer snarkiness, which undercuts the value of his argument. Finally, Van Creveld is too much a believer in the rational actor school of
strategic decisionmaking. In the section on World War II, for example, Creveld
states it was simply crazy that Germany and Japan ever thought they could win.
That misses the point; Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo believed they could win and
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that is why they went to war. Additionally, Van Creveld is too quick to minimize
the danger of a nuclear armed Iran. Despite its flaws, this book should be read
by those military professionals and historians who are interested in airpower
and its future.

Courtesy of Casemate Publishers

1781: The Decisive Year of the
Revolutionary War
by Robert L. Tonsetic
Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., Professor
of Military History, US Army War College

R

obert Tonsetic offers an examination of the year 1781,
which he calls the decisive year of the Revolutionary
Philadelphia:
War.
While one might debate whether that was the decisive
Casemate
year—as opposed to say 1776 that saw both the political
Publishers, 2011
transformation of the war and the all-important survival
258 pages
of Washington’s army—1781 was indisputably one of the
$32.95
most significant years of the war. Tonsetic covers both
northern and southern theaters and examines strategic,
operational, and tactical level events.
The year opened with a rebellion in the Pennsylvania line that might
have been fatal to the cause of independence, however, it ended with the British
defeated in all but the formal sense of a treaty. The strategic seat of the war
moved from New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia to Virginia, the Carolinas,
and Georgia. The year 1781 opened with battles in the Carolina backcountry at
Cowpens (17 January) and Guilford Courthouse (March 15). Although each side
won a battle, the British winning the big one, the combination proved disastrous
for the Crown. Cornwallis headed for the safety of the coast and ended up at
Yorktown waiting for the Royal Navy. In an act of joint and combined cooperation, the Americans’ new ally France provided both an army and a navy to help
isolate and besiege Yorktown. Meanwhile, the Americans managed to lose the
battles but still recover control of the Carolinas and Georgia. The year ended
with Cornwallis’ surrender and the Americans in control of their country, with
the exceptions of New York City, Charleston, Savannah, and outposts on Lake
Champlain and the Great Lakes. The political debate in London to end the war
lasted into 1782, and the Treaty of Paris was not signed until 3 September 1783,
but the war was over in all but the most formal sense by the end of 1781. That
is a good story, and Tonsetic tells it well.
There is always tension in a survey like this about the ratio between
generalities and details. Similarly, in a book about one year of a long war, there
is also tension between providing or assuming background knowledge about
the historical and strategic setting. Authors grapple with what needs explanation
and what the audience should already know. Tonsetic handles these tensions
ably. He moves the reader nimbly from broad brush to detailed descriptions,
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and a person likely to read this book will probably have the background knowledge the author assumes about armies and politics during the Revolution. The
book is interesting and readable; however, a few points deserve mention.
One such point is the Battle of the Capes (5 September 1781). That
naval engagement between the British and French fleets off the Chesapeake
Bay was critical to the eventual success at Yorktown and tremendously more
important to the war than Hobkirk Hill or Eutaw Springs. Although Tonsetic
discusses the battle and acknowledges its significance in about a page of text,
it comes off as a sideshow. In fact, the Wikipedia entry on the battle is longer,
more detailed, and better documented.
Tonsetic provides the reader seven maps—three at the operational
level (eastern coast, northern theater, and southern theater) and four tactical
(Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, Eutaw Springs, and Yorktown). While the
seven are well chosen, and the publisher rather than the author probably established the limit, four or five more would have been helpful. Maps contribute a
great deal more to a book’s success than any collection of pictures.
From an academic perspective, the book is light on endnotes, and does
not cite or acknowledge some obvious and important sources. For example, the
Rhode Island Historical Society for several years (ending in 2005) collected
and edited thirteen volumes of The Papers of General Nathaniel Greene. While
these are priced beyond the grasp of the individual, good academic libraries
have them. Since Greene was one of the main characters in the story of 1781,
one expects to find material from this excellent collection. More generally,
Tonsetic uses some primary sources, but most of the bibliography is secondary material. Since the audience seems to be the general public, this is not as
egregious as it would be in a primarily academic work.
Overall, the book is worth reading. Its strength is its breadth—it covers
matters that full histories of the war ignore or mention only in passing. That
breadth, however, is limited to military events, so those with interests in political, economic, diplomatic, and the social aspects of the year will find scant
satisfaction. That should not be a surprise. The book is about the decisive year
of the Revolutionary War, not the decisive year of the Revolution. That distinction also clarifies the issue of decisiveness that opened this review. From a
military perspective, 1781 was the decisive year of the Revolutionary War.
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Dangerous Liaisons: Anthropologists and the
National Security State
edited by Laura A. McNamara and Robert A. Rubinstein
Courtesy of SAR Press

Reviewed by Dr. Daniel G. Cox, Professor of Political
Science, School of Advanced Military Studies, US
Army Command and General Staff College, author of
Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa

T

he ostensible purpose of this book is to provide the
reader with opinions from a “small group of ethnographers
from four different countries, each with a variety
257 pages
of experiences studying war, violence, the military, and
$29.95
the state” in an effort to examine the relationship between
anthropologists and the national security state. It becomes
clear, however, from the first page of the introduction that bias, coupled with a
startling lack of a rigorous methodological approach, prevents this edited work
from being much more than a politically motivated collection of opinion essays.
The book is replete with postmodern and postcolonial references.
Constant allusions from multiple authors to neocolonial wars, American empire,
hegemonic militarism, among others betray the roots of the deep-seated biases
inherent in the subfield of cultural anthropology. The fact that this work is, for
the most part, little more than a collection of politically motivated opinions
emanating from the School for Advanced Research Annual Seminar further
dilutes any academic rigor. These biases are magnified by the fact that a number
of authors end up relying on the opinions of polemically inclined anthropologists and anthropological blogs, such as those of Roberto Gonzalez and Hugh
Gusterson, along with the web blog Zero Anthropology. What borders on the
almost humorous is the fact that authors are so unaware that their chapters are
presented as impartial attempts to explain the intersection of social science and
military endeavors. At least Gusterson admits in one of his articles deriding the
Human Terrain Systems (HTS) that cultural anthropology is academia’s most
left-leaning discipline and that many come to this field with a prejudice related
to war and warfare.
There is, indeed, something interesting about this book, but it is not
what the authors intended. For example, when the reader examines Chapter
8, “Anthropology, Research, and State Violence” by Israeli anthropologist
Eyal Ben-Ari, the book takes on an entirely different focus. Instead of providing an insightful, probing work exploring the intersections of anthropology
and the military, the book provides a glimpse into the tribal narrative cultural
anthropologists have weaved for themselves. Richard Geertz first referred to
these cultural webs in his book The Interpretation of Cultures, but many of the
authors in this volume are unaware of the cultural web that ensnares them. Ari
illuminates this perception by pointing out the liberal political bias presentation
in this work and within anthropology as a whole. He argues that a mythical
conception of the allegedly horrible use of American anthropologists in the
Santa Fe, New
Mexico: SAR Press,
2012
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Vietnam War led many in the field to distrust any collaboration with the military. In fact, several authors note that anthropological groups have attempted
to remove anthropologist collaborators from the field. German anthropologist
Maren Tomforde highlights the fact the American Anthropological Association
does not stand alone in its attempts at ending academic careers.
Besides a liberal bias, Ari argues American anthropologists suffer from
a peculiar form of arrogance and engage in what might be characterized as
“colonization of the mind.” Ari came to realize he had better luck publishing
in American anthropological journals if he used the coda of postmodernism
along with a healthy dose of America bashing. It is interesting to note there are
numerous references to the George W. Bush administration and none are positive. Ari worries that American anthropological dominance at conferences and
in professional journals will continue to influence the work of anthropologists
outside the United States.
It is with this understanding of these innate biases that R. Brian
Ferguson’s chapter on the HTS concludes “the capacity of HTS is helping to
build cannot be seen as being in the interests of the indigenous peoples of
the world—the people to whom anthropology is most responsible—unless
their interests coincide with the incorporation into a neoliberal US empire.”
So, too, is Laura McNamara’s chapter on interrogation techniques used by the
Bush Administration, which she dubs torture. She believes such acts permit “a
unique perspective on the dynamics through which America is made, unmade,
and remade.” Her chapter is placed in the proper context after reading Ari’s
chapter with its postmodern, anti-Bush context.
One would be hard pressed to recommend this work on its academic
merits. This book, however, is a great read for anyone interested in understanding academic ivory towers. It is also an integral window into the current state
of cultural anthropology.
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